It is shown that no theory that satisfies certain premises can exclude faster-than-light influences. The premises include neither the existence of hidden variables, nor counterfactual definiteness, nor any premise that effectively entails the general existence of outcomes of unperformed local measurements. All the premises are compatible with Copenhagen philosophy, and the principles and predictions of relativistic quantum field theory. The present proof is contrasted with an earlier one with the same objective. Also described is a manyworlds way of evading this faster-than-light effect by accepting von Neumann's Process I, but rejecting collapse.
Introduction.
The premises of Bell's original hidden-variable theorem [1] postulate the existence of a substructure that determines in a local manner the outcomes of a set of alternative possible measurements at most one of which can actually be performed. The implementation of the locality condition in this way thus involves a technical "hidden-variable" assumption that goes beyond the locality condition itself. Consequently, Bell's proof of the inconsistency of this local hidden-variable assumption with certain predictions of quantum theory casts no serious doubt on the locality condition: its implementation via the assumed hidden-variable substructure would appear to be the more likely cause of the derived inconsistency.
Bell [2] introduced later a seemingly weaker local hidden-variable assumption. However, this latter form can be shown [3, 4] to entail the original one, apart from errors that tend to zero as the number of experiments tends to infinity. Thus both forms of the hidden-variable assumption place strong conditions on the class of theories that are covered by the theorems. These conditions are essentially equivalent, logically, to the assumption that values can be pre-assigned conjunctively and locally to all of the outcomes of all of the alternative possible measurements. That assumption conflicts with what I believe to be the orthodox quantum philosophical attitude that one should not make any assumption that effectively postulates the existence of a well defined outcome of a localized measurement process that is not performed. Thus these hidden-variable theorems place in no serious jeopardy the locality idea that a free choice made by an experimenter in one space-time region has no influence in a second region that is space-like separated from the first.
The present paper shows that this locality idea fails, however, not only under the hidden-variable assumption (or some closely related presumption that effectively ensures the existence, within the theory, of outcomes of unperformed local measurements) but also in a much larger class of theories, namely those that are compatible with the properties of Free Choice and No Backward-in-Time Influence on Observed Outcomes, and that yield certain predictions of quantum theory in experiments of the Hardy type [5] . The first two of these three properties are now described.
Free Choices. For the purposes of understanding and applying quantum theory, the choice of which experiment is to be performed in a certain space-time region can be treated as an independent free variable localized in that region. Bohr repeatedly stressed the freedom of the experimenter to choose between alternative possible options. This availability of options is closely connected to his "complementarity" idea that the quantum state contains complementary kinds of information pertaining to the various alternative mutually exclusive experiments that might be chosen. Of course, no two mutually incompatible measurements can both be performed, and an outcome of an experiment can be specified only under the condition that that particular experiment be performed. No Backward-in-Time Influence. (NBITI) An outcome that has already been observed and recorded in some spacetime region at an earlier time can be considered fixed and settled, independently of which experiment a far-away experimenter will freely choose to perform at some later time. This assumption assigns no value to a local measurement except under the condition that this local measurement be performed. But any such locally observed value is asserted to be independent of which measurement will at some later time be freely chosen and performed in a spacelike separated region.
This NBITI assumption is required to hold in at least one Lorentz frame of reference, hence forth called LF . This NBITI assumption is compatible with relativistic quantum field theory. In the Tomonaga-Schwinger [6, 7] formulation the evolving state is defined on a forward moving space-like surface. Their work shows that this surface can be defined in a continuum of ways without altering the predictions of the theory, so that no Lorentz frame is singled out as preferred. On the other hand, their formalism allows the quantum state to be defined by the constant time surfaces in any one single Lorentz frame that one wishes to choose, and shows that in this one frame the evolution, including all reductions associated with specific outcomes of measurements, proceeds forward in time, with a well defined past that is not influenced either by later free choices made by experimenters or by the outcomes of the later measurements. Thus this NBITI assumption is compatible with the principles and predictions of relativistic quantum field theory. (Included in this assumption is the tacit assumption that if an outcome appears to an observer then the mutually exclusive alternative does not occur: the many-worlds idea that both outcomes occur is excluded. This option will be discussed separately.)
This NBITI assumption is a small part of the larger locality condition in question here, which is the demand that what an experimenter freely chooses to do in one region has no effect in a second region that is spacelike separated from the first. The no backward-in-time part of the no-faster-than-light condition can be imposed without generating any difficulties or conflict with relativistic quantum field theory. But a faster-than-light effect then appears elsewhere. In particular the following theorem holds:
Theorem. Suppose a theory or model is compatible with the premises:
1. Free Choices: This premise asserts that the choice made in each region as to which experiment will be performed in that region can be treated as a localized free variable, 2. No Backward in Time Influence: This premise asserts that experimental outcomes that have already occurred in an earlier region (in frame LF ) can be considered to be fixed and settled independently of which experiment will be chosen and performed later in a region spacelike separated from the first, and 3. Validity of Predicions of QT: Certain predictions of quantum theory in a Hardy-type experiment are valid.
Then this theory or model violates the following Locality Condition: The free choice made in one region as to which measurement will be performed there has, within the theory, no influence in a second region that is spacelike separated from the first.
Proof of the Theorem.
The theorem refers to the following Hardy-type [5] experimental set-up. There are two experimental spacetime regions L and R, which are spacelike separated, with L lying earlier than R in LF . The experimenter is L freely chooses either L1 or L2, and an outcome, either + or −, then appears in region L. Then the experimenter in region R freely chooses either R1 or R2, and one or the other of the two alternative possible outcomes, + or −, then appears in R.
The detectors are assumed to be 100% efficient, so that for whichever measurement is chosen in L one of the two alternative possible outcomes of that measurement, either + or −, will appear in L, with each of these possibilities occurring about half the time, and for whichever measurement is then chosen in R, some outcome of that measurement, either + or −, will appear in R.
For each of the two choices L1 or L2 available to the experimenter in L, and for each of the two alternative possible outcomes + or − of that experiment, quantum theory makes predictions for both of the two alternative choices R1 and R2 available to the experimenter in R.
In the statements that follow the symbol L1 will be an abbreviation of the statement "Experiment L1 is performed in L". The symbols L2, R1, and R2 will have analogous meanings.
The symbol L1+ will stand for the assertion "Experiment L1 is performed in L and outcome + of that experiment appears in L." The symbols L1−, L2+, L2−, R1+, R1−, R2+, and R2− have analogous meanings. Using these abbreviations the first two pertinent predictions of QT for this Hardy setup are these(*):
Under the condition that L2 is performed in L, If R2+ then L2+ (2.1) and If (L2+ and R1) then R1−.
(2.2)
If, in accordance with our assumption, the choice made in R does not affect the outcome that has already occurred in L, then these two conditions entail:
Property 1: Quantum theory predicts that if an experiment of the Hardytype is performed then, L2 implies SR, where, SR = If R2 is performed and gives outcome + then if, instead, R1 had been performed the outcome would have been −. Proof of Property 1: The concept "instead" is given an unambiguous meaning by the combination of the premises of "free choice", and "no backward in time influence": the choice between R1 and R2 is to be treated, within the theory, as a free variable, and switching between R1 and R2 is required to leave any outcome in the earlier region L undisturbed. But then (2.1) and (2.2) can be joined in tandem to give the result SR. L1 implies that SR is false.
Proof of Property 2: Quantum theory predicts that if L1 is performed then outcome − appears about half the time. Thus if L1 is chosen then there are cases where L1− is true. But in a case where L1− is true prediction (2.2) asserts that the premise of SR is true. But (2.3), in conjunction with our two premises that give meaning to "instead", implies that the conclusion of SR is not true: if R1 is performed instead of R2 the outcome is not necessarily R1−, as it was in case L2.
Any theory or model that makes SR true or false according to whether L2 or L1 is freely chosen in region L entails the existence of faster-than-light effects. This conclusion is discussed in the next section.
Connection to Earlier Works.
The aim of this work is similiar to that of an earlier work of this author [8] . That work was criticized by Unruh [9] , by Mermin [10] , and by Shimony and Stein [11] on various grounds. I have answered these objections [12, 13, 14] . However, the very existence of those challenges shows that the approach used in [9] has serious problems, which originate in the fact that it is based on classical modal logic.
That approach provides the possibility of a concise logically rigorous proof. However, that virtue is overshadowed by the following drawbacks: 1. Although the symbolic proof is concise and austere, that brevity is based on a background that most physicists lack. That lacuna makes the significance of the proof not easily accessible to most physicists. 2. The question arises as to whether the use of classical modal logic begs the question by being based in implicit ways on the deterministic notions of classical physics.
Classical modal logic itself is somewhat of an open question, and it is not immediately clear to what extent these issues undermine the proof.
For these reasons it now seems better to start from, and stick to, quantum thinking and language thoughout, rather than invoking the unfamiliar symbolic rules of classical modal logic.
The present proof, though in essence the same as the one given in 1997, differs greatly in form, and by more than just the use of the language of physicists. The earlier proof introduced an assumption LOC2 that turned out to be a source of confusion. LOC2 was introduce in order to set up a reducio ad absurdum argument, and was the assumption that was meant to be proved false. Much of the dissatisfaction of my earlier augument centered on the claim that I had not adequately justified this "assumption," which, however, I was trying to prove false. The present proof is simpler, in that it gives direct and simple proofs of the crucial properties 1 and 2, from which the faster-than-light conclusion follows directly.
The key objection to the argument was stated most clearly by Shimony and Stein. The explicit condition for the truth of SR is that, under the condition that R2 is performed in R and gives outcome + in R, if the free choice in R had gone the other way and, instead, R1 had been performed in R then the outcome in R would necessarily be −. These explicit conditions for the truth of SR are all localized in R. But Shimony and Stein stress that the word "instead" that appears in the statement SR contains an implicit reference to events in region L, by virtue of the demand that whatever occurs in L be not influenced by the free choice made by the experimenters in R. They say that this implicit reference to events in L makes the statement SR implicitly dependent upon events in L, and hence that the dependence of the truth of SR upon the choice between L1 and L2 constitutes no clear proof of a dependence in R upon the choice made in L. However, this objection does not take into account the nature of that implicit dependence, which is a denial of any influence of the free choice between R1 and R2 made R upon the events in L. The fact that this "instead" condition excludes the possibility that the switch from R1 to R2 has any effect back on L means that the change in the explicit structure of the truth conditions localized in R when L2 is changed to L1 can only be effected by an influence from L to R: the truth of a set of conditions localized in R cannot be changed by changing a free choice in L if there is no influence in either direction.
Comparison to Orthodox Ideas.
The conclusion obtained here about faster-than-light influences parallels Bohr's reply to the paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [15] . The assumption of those authors was that there was no faster-than-light influence of any kind. Bohr's response [16] was a partial rejection of that assumption: he granted that there was no faster-than light "mechanical disturbance" , but argued that "there is an influence on the very conditions that define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system."
A "mechanical disturbance" would be one capable of transmitting a signal, whereas the others pertain to "predictions", and hence to the theoretical structure, which from Bohr's point of view, was primarily a tool for making predictions about what outcomes will be observed under various alternative conditions.
Bohr's conclusions about the existence of faster-than-light influences, like the one obtained here, was made completely within the framework of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. But the present argument is more direct than the philosophically subtle argument of Bohr. The influence demonstrated here is not on the "conditions that define the possible types of predictions" but on the structure of the predictions themselves.
All the premises of the present nonlocality theorem are compatible with orthodox quantum philosophy, and both the premises and conclusions are compatible with relativistic quantum field theory. The theorem therefore covers orthodox quantum theory as a special case.
The locality condition whose violation is demonstrated here is similar to the one occurring in Bell's theorems in that: (1), the dependence in question is on an experimenter's free choice of which measurement to perform in a certain region, and (2), the property that depends on this free choice are predictions about both of the alternative possibilities between which the experimenter in the other region is free to choose. But the present argument is carried out without using any combination of properties that are logically equivalent to Bell's hidden-variable assumptions: the premises used here are significantly weaker than those of Bell's theorems, and hence the class of models covered is significantly larger.
By dispensing in this way with the hidden-variable substructure, the present theorem evades challenges to Bell's theorems of the kind that recently appeared in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science [17] . 5. A Many-Worlds Way Out.
The significance of this faster-than-light theorem is that it places a strong and anti-intuitive condition on any model or theory that seeks to reproduce the predictions of quantum theory. However, there is a interesting way out. The proof given above depends tacitly upon the orthodox idea of the collapse of the wave function. It was first pointed out in reference 18 that if one rejects the collapse idea then the physical conditions that define the correlated states and associated amplitudes do not come into existence until the (essentially classical) signals carrying the information about the outcomes in the two regions R and L come together in a region that lies in the intersection of the forward light cones from these two regions. But there is no violation of any faster-than-light condition if the region in which the pertinent correlations come into being is confined to that intersection of those two forward light cones. This consideration weighs in favor of adopting a many-worlds (or manyminds) type of ontology. On the other hand, a serious difficulty with the usual many-worlds/minds approach was recently described in reference 19. The problem, basically, is that the traditional many-worlds/minds approach generates continua of overlapping states, rather than the sharp divisions entailed by von Neumann's Process I, and that circumstance creates problems in constructing probabilities.
This situation suggests a hybrid approach that accepts the objective reality of von Neumann's Process I, but rejects collapse. Von Neumann [20] himself postulated Process I, and also the Schroedinger Process II, but made no commitment to Process III, the collapse to one of the several nonoverlapping branches specified by Process I. I view this omission as significant. By postulating the existence of Processes I and II, but rejecting Process III, one can avoid the difficulties described in reference 19, and avoid also the fasterthan-light effects described here. The essential point is that the "state" of a subsystem is defined by tracing over "other" variables, and therefore Process I, unlike Process III, has no effect on faraway systems.
This hybrid approach also aids in the formulation of an adequate general theory of measurement and control, but a discussion of that point would lead beyond the scope of this note. 
